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What	Was	Molyneux's	Question	a	Question	About?	Jonathan	Cohen	(University	of	California,	San	Diego)	and	Mohan	Matthen	(University	of	Toronto)1	Nearly	nine	hundred	years	ago,	the	Andalusian	Muslim	statesman	and	philosopher,	Abu	Bakr	ibn	Tufail	(1105-1185),	conjectured	that	all	sensory	qualities	were	material,	and	inferred	from	this	that	they	would	have	at	least	some	characteristics	that	can	be	discerned	independently	 of	 sensory	 experience.	 Thus,	 he	 said,	 if	 a	 newly	 sighted	man	 encountered	colours	for	the	first	time,	he	would	experience	them	in	ways	consonant	with	(at	least	some)	descriptions	 of	 colours	 he	 had	 been	 given	 while	 still	 unsighted.	 Or	 perhaps	 he	 meant	something	stronger,	namely	that	the	newly	sighted	man	could	actually	recognize	the	colours	on	the	basis	of	the	descriptions	he	had	been	given	while	still	unsighted.2	Of	course,	on	either	interpretation,	ibn	Tufail’s	claim	is	controversial:	for,	granting	that	all	sensory	qualities	are	material,	it	may	be	that	at	least	some	material	qualities	are	known	to	us	only	by	our	sensory	experience	of	them—and	so	the	newly	sighted	man	might	have	no	prior	knowledge	on	which	to	hang	the	descriptions	he	was	given	of	colour.	Nevertheless,	the	conjecture	prepares	us	for	the	realization	that	some	material	qualities	might	not	be	available	to	any	sense,	and	others	to	more	than	one.	The	translation	of	ibn	Tufail’s	book	into	Latin	by	Edward	Pococke	in	1671	sparked	a	lively	 discussion	 of	 the	 empirical	 construction	 of	 concepts.	 (See	 Goodman,	 this	 volume.)	William	 Molyneux	 pursued	 ibn	 Tufail's	 conjecture	 in	 a	 narrower	 and	 less	 controversial	
	1	This	is	a	fully	collaborative	work	of	the	two	authors.	2	In	this	formulation,	ibn	Tufail’s	conjecture	concerning	colour	does	not	turn	on	amodal	or	inter-modal	knowledge.	In	Lenn	Goodman’s	translation	(this	volume),	the	crucial	passage	is		Suppose	.	.	.	his	eyesight	were	restored	and	he	could	see.	He	would	walk	all	through	the	town	finding	nothing	in	contradiction	to	what	he	had	believed,	nor	would	anything	look	wrong	to	him.	The	colors	he	encountered	would	conform	to	the	guidelines	that	had	been	sketched	out	for	him.		This	 leaves	 it	 open	whether	 or	 not	 visually	based	 “guidelines”	 could	 enable	 him,	 in	Molyneux’s	words,	 to	“distinguish	and	identify	by	sight	alone”	which	of	an	apple	and	a	leaf	was	red	and	which	was	green.	For	suppose	he	had	been	told	something	like:	“Red	is	a	dark,	warm	colour	that	is	very	unlike	green,	which	is	bright	and	cool.”	C.L.	 Hardin’s	 (1988)	 discussion	 of	 spectral	 inversion	 (ibid.	134-54)	 could	 be	 taken	 to	 imply	 that	 he	might	actually	be	able	to	identify	red	and	green	on	this	basis.	If	so,	then,	perhaps	ibn	Tufail	was	right.		
WHAT	WAS	MOLYNEUX’S	QUESTION	A	QUESTION	ABOUT?	
	 2	
form.3	Famously,	he	asked	Locke	(who	would	likely	have	recognized	the	allusion)	whether	a	newly-sighted	man	could,	by	sight	alone,	distinguish	and	identify	a	globe	and	a	cube,	which	he	previously	 knew	only	 by	 touch.	 This	 is	 a	 specific	 problem	about	 qualities	 that	 can	be	sensed	 in	 more	 than	 one	 modality—Is	 there	 an	 inter-modally	 transferrable,	 or	 amodal,	element	in	the	identification	of	three-dimensional	solids?	Though	derived	from	ibn	Tufail,	this	question	leads	in	a	different	direction.	Our	purpose	here	is	to	ask	how	it	generalizes.	What	was	the	theoretical	nerve	that	it	is	supposed	to	touch?	Why	is	it	so	revealing?		The	 problem	 that	 guides	 us	 in	 this	 paper	 is	more	 pointed	 than	Molyneux's	 about	sensory	knowledge	 in	a	newly	acquired	modality.	We	ask:	How	are	 ideas	 formed	 in	each	modality,	and,	given	how	they	are	formed,	what	cross-modal	correspondences	can	we	expect	to	find?	This	question	invites	a	more	granular	line	of	inquiry—one	that	takes	us	into	details	of	the	construction	of	specific	qualities.	But	it	makes	ibn	Tufail's	conjecture	and	Molyneux's	question	unexpectedly	relevant	to	a	number	of	unconnected,	but	familiar	problems	that	arise	out	 of	 contemporary	 theorizing	 about	 perception.	 For,	 in	 contrast	 with	 many	 familiar	approaches,	ours	poses	questions	about	cross-modal	divergence	and	convergence	that	range	more	widely	than	those	envisaged	by	eighteenth	century	philosophers.	These	questions	are	neutral	about	sensory	carry-over	of	the	kind	queried	by	Molyneux.4	In	short,	it	turns	out	that	there	are	more	questions	and	more	answers	on	this	terrain	than	Molyneux,	Locke,	and	most	of	their	successors	realized.	
I.		On	the	origin	of	general	ideas	Very	likely,	Molyneux	and	Locke	thought	of	the	question	like	this.	We	know	certain	shapes	by	touch.	We	also	know	the	very	same	shapes	by	sight.	Consider,	then,	the	idea	of	a	shape	 given	 to	 us	 by	 touch—the	mental	 representation	 of	 a	 shape	 that	 we	 arrive	 at	 by	touching	it	("the	Object	of	the	Understanding	when	a	Man	thinks,"	as	Locke	puts	it).	Is	this	the	same	as	the	idea	of	the	same	shape	given	to	us	by	sight?	Or	are	these	ideas	different?	To	
	3	Whether	he	came	across	the	topic	by	reading	ibn	Tufail	or	through	the	ensuing	discussion	is	not	clear.	4	In	fact,	one	way	that	our	approach	is	neutral	is	that	it	does	not	turn	on	any	particular	demarcation	of	the	sense-modalities.	 In	Matthen	and	Cohen	(forthcoming),	we	even	note	 the	possibility	of	within-modality	Molyneux	Questions.	
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repeat:	these	questions	are	not	the	same	as	asking	whether	there	can	be	tactual	and	visual	ideas	of	the	same	shape.	There	can	be	different	ideas	of	the	same	thing.	Molyneux's	question	is	about	the	ability	to	identify	a	shape,	or	to	distinguish	it	from	others.	Whether	or	not	he	and	Locke	were	clear	about	 it,	 this	 is	a	question	about	general	ideas,	 i.e.,	 ideas	 of	 repeatable	 types—Can	 the	 newly-sighted	man	 visually	 recognize	 this	particular	 thing	here	as	an	 instance	of	a	general	 idea	 that	he	earlier	arrived	at	by	 tactual	experience	of	other	things?	According	to	Locke,	a	general	idea	is	an	abstraction	created	by	discarding	irrelevant	characteristics	of	particulars.	For	instance,	the	general	idea	of	a	triangle	is	"neither	Oblique	nor	Rectangle,	neither	Equilateral,	Equicrural	nor	Scalenon;	but	all	and	none	of	these	at	once."	(Essay	IV.vii.9)	The	question	Molyneux	poses	is	not	about	all	aspects	of	visual	or	tactual	experience	of	globes	and	cubes.	A	particular	globe	might	look	red,	shiny,	and	about	a	 foot	across;	at	the	same	time,	 it	might	 feel	cold,	dry,	and	about	a	 foot	across.	Some	 of	 these	 attributes	 of	 the	 globe	 are	 purely	 visual,	 some	 purely	 tactual;	 one	 is	(apparently)	shared.	None	of	them,	however,	are	essential	to	the	general,	repeatable	idea,	GLOBE,	 as	 such;5	 they	 are	 all	 discarded	 in	 the	 psychological	 act	 of	 generalization	 that	terminates	in	that	general	idea.	This	invites	the	question:	What	qualities	are	retained	when	a	blind	man	forms	a	general	idea	of	a	globe	from	his	tactual	experience?		Now:	It	is	clear	that	in	at	least	some	cases,	one	can,	by	discarding	components	of	an	idea	 originally	 experienced	 by	 touch,	 arrive	 at	 a	 residue	 is	 not	 specifically	 tactual—the	general	 ideas	 THREE-DIMENSIONAL,	 SYMMETRICAL,	 EQUALLY	 SLOPED	 are	 examples	 of	this.	So	when	we	consider	the	general	idea,	GLOBE,	formed	from	touch,	we	should	ask:	Are	the	 retained	 qualities	 specifically	 tactual,	 or	 does	 the	 resultant	 general	 mental	representation	subsume	the	visual	presentation	as	well,	as	a	presentation	of	the	very	same	repeatable	type?	And	this	naturally	raises	the	question	whether	the	general	idea	that	results	from	normal	visual	processing	is	the	same	or	different	in	content	from	the	idea	that	the	blind	man	possesses.	Molyneux's	 Question	 has	 sometimes	 been	 thought	 to	 be	 about	 the	 "differences	between	the	qualitative	or	phenomenal	character"	of	visual	and	tactual	experiences	of	the	
	5	We	capitalize	terms	that	stand	for	ideas	and	italicize	those	that	stand	for	properties.	
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same	thing	(see	e.g.,	Schwenkler	2019).	For	the	subjective	experience	of	exploring	a	globe	by	touch	is	obviously	quite	different	from	that	of	examining	it	by	sight6—and	this	is	clearly	a	relevant	consideration.	But	Molyneux's	Question	is	not	about	the	particular	experiences	that	a	newly-sighted	man	suffers	when	he	looks	at	a	globe.	Rather,	it	is	about	this	man’s	ability	to	apply	 a	 general	 idea—i.e.,	 a	 representation	of	 a	 repeatable	perceptual	property—that	he	obtained	by	 touch	to	objects	newly	encountered	 in	visual	experience.	Since	general	 ideas	omit	 certain	 features	 of	 particular	 experiences,	 we	 have	 to	 ask	 whether	 the	 retained	characteristics	are	inter-modally	comparable.	In	other	words:	Can	the	subjectively	different	experiences	of	the	same	shape	thrown	up	by	two	different	sense	modalities	be	subsumed	under	 the	 same	 general	 idea,	 or	 at	 least	 general	 ideas	 that	 can	 be	 compared	 across	phenomenal	differences?		Locke	answered	Molyneux	negatively.	And	perhaps	he	did	so	because	he	was	not	alert	(in	that	context)	to	how	vision	and	touch	can	arrive	at	the	same	general	ideas	by	discarding	specifically	modal	 aspects	 of	 experience.7	 But	 even	 if	we	disagree	with	 Locke	 about	 this,	there	is	another	question	that	arises	for	anybody	who	was	inclined	to	think	that	general	ideas	of	shape	are	cross-modally	comparable.	Allow	that	a	general	idea	arrived	at	by	touch	alone	could	in	fact	be	the	same	in	content	as	that	arrived	at	by	vision.	We	still	do	not	know	whether	it	is	equally	apt	to	be	applied	to	a	particular	idea	by	vision.	Take	the	idea	BOUNDED	OBJECT.	This	 is	 clearly	an	 idea	 that	has	application	 in	more	 than	one	modality.	Yet,	 its	method	of	application	might	differ	in	different	modalities:	specifically,	in	touch,	vision,	and	audition.	So,	it	 could	 very	well	 be	 that	 a	newly	 sighted	man	might	be	hesitant	 in	 identifying	bounded	objects	visually.		Coming	 back	 to	 the	 general	 idea,	 GLOBE,	 the	 point	 to	 be	 emphasized	 here	 is	 that	shared	content	is	not	the	only	question	of	interest	that	Molyneux	raised.	Concede,	in	other	words,	that	there	is	only	one	general	idea	in	play,	or	that	there	are	two	but	with	significant	cross-modal	structural	correspondences	of	content.	The	question	still	remains:	Can	one	just	
	6	But	see	Campbell	1996	(304),	who	thinks	(on	naïve	realist	grounds)	that	the	shape	itself	constitutes,	indeed	individuates,	any	experience	of	it.	7	In	Essay	II	5,	Locke	writes,	“we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, 
figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling.” For	discussion	of	this	and	related	points,	see	Matthen	and	Cohen,	forthcoming.	
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as	easily	use	the	tactually	formed	idea	to	"distinguish	and	identify"	a	shape	as	a	globe	(rather	than	a	cube)	when	looking	at	it	as	when	touching	it?	And:	Is	the	perceptual	process	by	which	retained	qualities	are	identified	analogous	or	different?			
II.	Experience,	ideas,	and	properties	When	 addressing	 Molyneux's	 Question,	 one	 can	 ask	 about	 at	 least	 four	 different	contrasts	between	visual	and	haptic	perception.	(1)	Experience	of	seeing	a	globe	vs	experience	of	feeling	it	by	touch.	(2)	Idea	generalized	from	visual	experience	vs	idea	generalized	from	touch.		(3)	The	property	revealed	by	vision	vs	the	property	revealed	by	touch.		(4)	The	ability	to	re-identify	by	vision	the	property	revealed	by	touch.	Much	of	 the	philosophical	dialectic	regarding	MQ	revolves	around	the	connections	among	the	first	three	contrasts.	We’ll	follow	this	dialectic	for	the	most	part,	though	we	will	make	mention	of	the	additional	contrasts	with	(4).	On	one	hand,	it	 is	clear	that	the	experiences	(1)	are	different.	Some	are	inclined	to	think	that	this	settles	the	question	about	the	ideas,	(2).		An	empiricist	might	argue	that	one	cannot	erase	 the	sensory	source	of	one's	general	 ideas	 in	 the	relevant	cases.	 If	 so,	 then	a	negative	answer	to	Molyneux’s	Question	follows:	the	general	ideas	are	different.		On	the	other	hand,	sphere	is	a	geometric	or	spatial	property	that	entails	qualities	such	as	symmetry	and	roundness.	Some	writers	(e.g.,	Bennett,	1965,	and	Evans,	1985)	hold	that	these	 qualities	 are	 inter-modally	 comparable.	 According	 to	 them,	 there	 is	 no	 relevant	difference	 between	 the	 items	 in	 (3).	 And	 this,	 they	 think,	 settles,	 or	 at	 least	 severely	constrains,	the	question	about	ideas—SPHERE	must	be	the	same	general	idea	across	vision	and	touch,	or	at	least	structurally	similar	enough	to	distinguish	it	from	CUBE.	Both	sides	err	by	neglecting	the	bridge	from	their	starting	point	to	the	middle	term—	that	middle	term	being	(2)	general	ideas.	For	both,	the	question	is:	Is	sensory	experience	of	a	 geometrical	 solid	 sufficient	 to	 form	a	modality-neutral	 subjective	 representation	of	 the	solid?	An	empiricist	 like	Locke	answers	 ‘No'	because	of	 the	difference	 in	the	experiences;	Bennett	 and	 Evans	 answer	 'Yes'	 because	 of	 the	 alleged	 non-modality	 of	 the	 sensed	
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properties.	But	it's	not	clear	exactly	where	the	answer	turns	from	negative	to	positive	when	we	 go	 from	 (1)	 to	 (3).	 As	 against	 Locke,	 there's	 the	 possibility	 that	 all	 tactually	 specific	dimensions	of	the	idea	are	bleached	out	by	the	generalization	process	before	we	get	to	(2).	As	against	Bennett	and	Evans,	there's	the	possibility	that	even	if	our	ideas	of	shape	represent	an	amodal,	or	intermodally	comparable,	property,	the	general	 ideas	formed	from	modally	specific	experience	are	sufficiently	tainted	by	their	modal	origins	as	to	be	not	only	distinct,	but	also	difficult,	or	even	impossible,	to	apply	in	vision	when	they	originate	in	touch.	This	 sort	 of	 question	 can	 be	 asked	 about	 other	 general	 ideas	 as	well.	 Ibn	 Tufail's	conjecture	 was	 that	 colour	 could	 be	 known	 (at	 least	 descriptively)	 by	 touch.	 This	 is	implausible,	 because	 colour	 is	 a	 specifically	 visual	 idea	 (but	 see	note	2	 above).	But	what	about	other	features	known	by	more	than	one	sense?	Not	all	of	these	are	shapes;	indeed,	not	all	are	spatial.	For	instance,	what	about	number?	If	the	newly-sighted	man	were	shown	one	globe	on	his	left	and	two	on	his	right,	could	he	distinguish	and	identify	the	cardinality	of	the	two	collections	by	sight	alone?	And	(as	Gareth	Evans	asked)	what	about	temporally	extended	experiences:	if	the	newly	sighted	man	were	shown	a	steady	light	on	the	left	and	a	pulsating	one	on	the	right,	could	he	tell	which	was	which?	One	could	ask:	is	there	a	general	recipe	for	answering	questions	of	this	sort?	Given	that	we	don't	know	in	advance	what	will	be	omitted	in	any	given	process	of	generalization,	it	doesn't	seem	that	there	could	be.	In	earlier	work	(Matthen	and	Cohen	forthcoming),	we	argued	that	though	a	negative	answer	 is	 warranted	 in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 cases,	 this	 conclusion	 can	 only	 be	 reached	empirically	and	piecemeal.	Both	empiricists	like	Locke	and	their	opponents	like	Evans	are	wrong	to	treat	Molyneux's	Question	as	a	single	question	about	the	origin	of	ideas	in	different	modalities.8	Rather,	it	is	properly	posed	as	a	question	about	specific	ideas	in	specific	contexts.	Thus,	we	 posited	 “Many	Molyneux	Questions,”	 and	 argued	 for	 a	 classificatory	 scheme	 of	these	 by	 the	 spatiotemporal	 dimensionality	 of	 the	 property	 represented	 by	 the	 idea	 in	question.		In	this	paper,	we	venture	beyond	this	conclusion	in	three	ways.		
	8	Cf.	Glenney	2013. 	
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We	 argue,	 first	 (sections	 III-V),	 that	 in	 each	 modality,	 complex	 ideas	 may	 differ	structurally	from	the	corresponding	property.	This	sheds	light	on	how	(contrary	to	the	conclusions	of	Gareth	Evans)	non-correspondent	ideas	of	the	same	shape	might	be	constructed	from	an	inter-modally	shared	representation	of	space.	In	these	cases,	the	 answer	 to	 Molyneux’s	 Question	 is	 No:	 the	 newly	 sighted	 man	 does	 not	 have	anything	on	which	to	base	visual	identification.	Second,	 we	 show	 (sections	 VI-VII)	 that	 in	 certain	 cases,	 different	 modalities	contingently	construct	structurally	correspondent	ideas	of	shape-	and	space-related	properties.	 In	 these	cases,	we	get	a	somewhat	surprising	Yes,	 if	not	 to	Molyneux's	Question	as	posed,	then	at	least	to	the	question	whether	there	are	significant	cross-modal	 correspondences.	 (Of	 particular	 interest	 in	 this	 argument:	 the	 "new"	modalities	created	by	sensory	substitution.)	Finally	(section	VIII),	we	ask	(but	leave	unanswered)	new	questions	in	the	style	of	ibn	Tufail	and	Molyneux	regarding	a	significant	class	of	non-spatial	ideas,	namely	those	involved	in	evaluative	perception	and	perceptual	affect.	
III.	A	New	Question:	Analyzing	ideas	Let's	now	consider	a	different	path	into	Molyneux's	Question,	similar	in	some	ways	to	the	one	originally	explored	by	Denis	Diderot	(1749/1951)	and	discussed	by	Gareth	Evans	(1985).	Locke	distinguishes	between	simple	and	complex	 ideas.	 Simple	 ideas	are	not	put	together	from	other	ideas;	complex	ideas	are.	For	any	complex	idea,	one	can	ask:	How	is	it	constructed	from	simples?	Now,	suppose	(as	many	philosophers	have)	that	the	simple	ideas	of	 touch	and	vision	are	always	point-located	qualities.9	Then,	 it	would	 follow	 that	 shape-ideas,	such	as	GLOBE	and	CUBE,	which	are	about	spatial	distributions	of	points,	are	complex.	So,	if	one	could	establish	that	the	process	of	constructing	the	idea	SPHERE	from	point-located	qualities	is	structurally	different	in	touch	and	in	vision,	this	would	give	us	reason	for	thinking	that	this	idea	is	modally	specific.	To	start	with,	the	question	whether	a	newly	sighted	man	is	able	to	recognize	a	tactual	complex	 idea	without	 using	 touch	 is	 different	 from	 the	 question	 whether	 he	 is	 able	 to		9	This	is	the	assumption	of	the	colour	mosaic	theory	sketched	by	Lewis	1966.	
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recognize	it	by	vision.	For	consider	the	complex	idea,	RS=ROUND	AND	STATIONARY.	Hold	in	abeyance	the	question	whether	the	newly	sighted	man	would	visually	be	able	to	identify	the	simple	 ideas,	ROUND	and	STATIONARY.	Allow	this	man	whatever	 time	and	experience	 is	sufficient	to	learn	these	ideas.	And	now	put	the	question:	what	more	would	it	take	for	him	to	be	able	to	identify	instances	of	RS?	Presumably	nothing	more.	AND	is	an	analytic	operation,	and	 therefore	not	one	whose	acquisition	depends	on	sensory	experiences	 that	 the	newly	sighted	man	might	be	 thought	 to	 lack.	So,	 it	 is	extremely	plausible	 to	 think	that	he	needs	nothing	more	to	learn	RS	than	how	to	identify	its	simple	components.	But	this	argument	does	not	show	that	RS	can	be	applied	visually.	Of	course,	we	have	reason	for	believing	that	the	conjunctive	idea	AND	is	deployed	in	cognition.	But	it	is	a	substantive	empirical	question,	not	something	that	can	simply	be	taken	for	granted,	that	AND	can	be	applied	straightforwardly	in	the	construction	and	deployment	of	ideas	within	vision.	Second,	note	also	that	one	cannot	safely	conclude	that	AND	is,	indeed,	applied	in	the	formation	of	a	visual	idea	merely	from	the	fact	that	the	idea	picks	out	a	property	that	has	a	conjunctive	 analysis.	 Some	 small	 animals	 preyed	 on	 by	 large	 birds	 have	 a	 distinctive	behavioural	response	(they	freeze)	to	visually	detected	instances	of	the	conjunctive	property	
dark	 and	 looming	 (but	 not	 to	 visually	 detected	 instances	 of	 the	 property	 dark	 or	 of	 the	property	looming).	Presumably	they	have	a	visual	representation/idea	of	(i.e.,	whose	content	is)	 the	 complex,	 conjunctive	 property.	 But	 it	 does	 not	 follow	 that	 this	 idea	 is	 a	 complex	construction	with	DARK,	LOOMING,	and	AND	as	constituents:	it	could	well	be	that	their	idea	of	the	property	dark	and	looming	is	an	uncomposed	atom.	(As	an	aside:	this	would	cast	doubt	on	the	notion	that	all	simple	ideas	are	point-located	qualities.)		In	sum,	it	is	wrong	to	think	that	 if	a	property	can	be	analysed	as	a	conjunction,	 then	the	 idea	of	 that	property	will	be	conjunctive	(and	hence	complex).	The	logical	or	mathematical	structure	of	a	property	need	not	be	reflected	in	the	structure	of	the	sensory	idea	of	that	property	(cf.	Hopkins,	2005).	On	reflection,	it	seems	that	Diderot's	approach	to	Molyneux's	Question	also	leans	on	an	analysis	of	the	property,	though	in	a	somewhat	different	way.	Diderot	famously	holds	that	vision	and	touch	must	have	different	ways	of	apprehending	the	mathematical	structure	of	shape-properties.	He	assumes	(mistakenly,	as	we	contend)	that	since	shape-properties	are	spatial	distributions	of	points,	 shape	 ideas	must	also	be	constructed	 from	ideas	of	spatial	
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distributions.	He	reasons	that,	since	one	can	at	a	single	glance	form	an	impression	of	how	spheres	look,	the	visual	idea	can	be	formed	by	a	simultaneous	apprehension	of	the	spatial	relationships	of	constituent	points.	 In	contrast,	he	supposes	 that	 the	 tactual	 idea	of	 these	relations	can	only	be	formed	by	a	temporally	extended	process:	one	cannot	apprehend	the	whole	sphere	simultaneously	by	touch,	and	so	one	has	to	rely	on	moving	one's	hands	over	it.	He	concludes	that	the	tactual	idea	of	a	sphere	is	different	from	the	visual	idea—the	former	has	a	kind	of	temporal	structure	that	the	latter	lacks.	But	 this	 line	of	 argument	 is	mistaken.	 It	 is	 true	 that	vision	and	 touch	differ	 in	 the	spatial	 range	 over	 which	 they	 deliver	 information	 at	 a	 single	 instant.	 However,	 this	 is	precisely	 the	 sort	 of	 difference	 that	 is	 put	 aside	 in	 the	 abstractive	 process	 that	 leads	 to	general	 ideas.	For	consider:	 if	a	sphere	 is	sufficiently	small	relative	to	the	spatiotemporal	range	 of	 vision	 then	 it	 can	 be	 visually	 apprehended	 at	 a	 moment,	 and	 one	 can	 then	immediately	form	from	it	a	visually	generated	general	idea	of	sphericality.10	(In	this	process,	one	discards	size	information,	inter	alia.)	And	exactly	the	same	is	true	of	touch:	if	a	sphere	is	sufficiently	small	relative	to	the	spatiotemporal	range	of	touch,	one	can	apprehend	its	shape	at	a	single	instant	and	form	from	it	a	haptically-generated	general	idea	of	sphericality	(which	discards	size	information,	inter	alia).11		Of	course,	Diderot	is	right	that	if	the	sphere	is	too	large	to	be	haptically	apprehended	at	a	time,	then	one	needs	to	engage	in	temporally	extended	haptic	exploration	to	form	from	it	a	general	idea	of	sphericality.	But	the	same	is	true	of	vision,	with	the	difference	that	the	spatiotemporal	extent	of	the	visual	glance	is	larger	than	that	of	touch.	But	this	is	irrelevant,	given	that	size	information	is	discarded	when	we	form	the	idea,	SPHERE.	It	would	seem,	then,	that,	with	respect	to	the	perceptual	acquisition	of	general	ideas,	the	modalities	of	vision	and	touch	are	on	a	par:	Diderot's	alleged	structural	contrast	between	the	two	rests	entirely	on	a	modal	difference	 in	spatiotemporal	range	that	 is	properly	 ignored	in	consideration	of	the	perceptual	acquisition	of	general	 ideas.	He	simply	overlooks	the	possibility	that	a	general	
	10	See	Klatzky	and	Lederman	(1995)	on	the	haptic	glance.		11	In	neither	case	does	the	apprehension	at	issue	demand	perceptual	contact	with	all	of	the	points	in	the	sphere;	rather,	what	is	required	is	presumably	just	the	sort	of	perceptual	contact	with	facing	surfaces	that	supports	acquisition	of	a	general	shape	idea.	This	is	another	way	of	reinforcing	the	point	that	the	structure	of	our	perceptually	derived	ideas	need	not	be	the	same	as	that	of	the	corresponding	properties.	
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idea	of	SPHERE	could	be	constructed	from	an	experience	of	a	sphere	that	is	small	enough	to	be	apprehended	at	an	instant,	whether	it	is	a	hand-size	sphere	apprehensible	by	touch	or	a	much	larger	one	apprehensible	by	vision.	Moreover,	and	even	putting	the	last	point	aside,	Diderot	neglects	the	possibility	that	even	if	touch	apprehends	particular	spheres	temporally,	the	general	tactual	idea	of	a	sphere	could	be	formed	by	discarding	temporality.	(Evans	gives	some	anecdotal	evidence	in	favour	of	this	possibility.)	But	even	then,	it	would	not	follow	that	touch	and	sight	are	equally	adept	at	making	the	comparison.	Even	if	both	modalities	have	a	non-temporal	idea,	they	might	have	different	 ideas.	 Or	 they	 may	 have	 the	 same	 idea	 (or	 structurally	 comparable	 ones);	nonetheless,	blind	subjects	may	still	not	be	able	to	make	the	cross-modal	comparison	in	a	way	that	enables	them	immediately	to	visually	recognize	spheres	when	they	recover	sight.	And,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	Pawan	Sinha	and	colleagues	report	empirical	evidence	that	indicates	an	 inability	 of	 newly	 sighted	 people	 to	 recognize	 shapes	 (Held	 et.	 al.	 2011;	 Ostrovsky,	Andalman,	and	Sinha	2006;	Ostrovsky	et.	al	2009).	In	short,	we	have	no	grounds	for	a	general	answer,	or	even	grounds	to	formulate	a	general	question.		To	summarize	our	line	of	thought	in	this	section:	It	is	wrong	to	assume	that	a	sensory	idea	 of	 a	 shape	 must	 reflect	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 shape-property.	 A	 sphere	 is	 a	 certain	distribution	 of	 points	 in	 space,	 but	 it	 doesn't	 follow	 that	 the	 visual	 idea	 of	 a	 shape	 is	 a	representation	 just	 of	 that	 distribution—it	 may	 instead	 reflect	 gross	 characteristics	distributed	across	 a	 surface,	 for	 example,	 a	 smooth	 lighting	 gradient	or	 a	 certain	kind	of	textural	variation.	For	this	reason,	we	can't	assume	that	touch	and	vision	recognize	spheres	in	the	same	way.	If	each	relies	on	clues	and	indications	rather	than	the	actual	geometrical	analysis	of	a	sphere,	they	might	rely	on	different	cues.	Or	they	might	rely	on	comparable	cues	(see	section	VI).	The	question	is	open.		This	informs	our	general	approach	to	inter-modal	transfer:	the	question	has	to	be	put	for	specific	ideas	of	specific	shapes,	and	not	for	whole	modalities.	Interestingly,	the	answers	given	 by	 Locke,	Diderot,	 and	many	 contemporary	 philosophers	 (including	Gareth	Evans)	follow	something	much	closer	to	a	whole-modality	strategy.	However,	we	suggest,	reflection	on	Molyneux’s	question	about	globes	and	cubes	motivates	a	finer-grained	approach.	
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IV.	Space	and	the	Modalities:	Sceptical	Remarks	On	its	face,	the	question	Molyneux	poses	is	about	shape.	But	Evans	attempts	to	reduce	this	 to	 an	 issue	 about	 space—specifically,	 about	 "the	 relation	 between	 the	 perceptual	representation	of	space	attributable	to	the	blind,	and	the	perceptual	representation	of	space	available	in	visual	perception."	This	is	wrong	for	a	number	of	reasons.	The	shift	from	shape	to	 space	occurs	against	 the	background	of	Diderot's	 argument.	As	we	have	 seen,	Diderot	thought	that	the	blind	can	perceptually	register	shape	only	by	temporally	extended	tactile	exploration,	and	that	their	idea	of	shape	is	therefore	that	of	a	process.	Evans	rightly	rejected	this	argument.	Evans	 is	 right	 to	 reject	 a	 facile	 inference	 from	 temporally	 extended	 experience	 of	shape	 to	 temporally	 extended	 representation	 of	 space,	 but	 his	 critique	 does	 not	 touch	Diderot.	For	a	follower	of	Diderot	could	concede	that	the	blind	operate	with	a	"simultaneous"	conception	 of	 space	 when	 they	 are	 locating	 individual	 points,	 while	 still	 insisting	 that	temporal-process	notions	have	to	be	collated	over	time	in	order	to	get	ideas	of	shape.	Non-simultaneous	 shape-representations	 are	 compatible	 with	 an	 underlying	 simultaneous	space-representations.		More	significantly,	both	Diderot	and	Evans	overlook	the	fact	that	there	could	be	more	than	one	way	 to	keep	 track	of	position	 (Tolman	1948,	O’Keefe	and	Nadel	1978,	Gallistel,	1990).	Some	animals	use	travel	metrics	("Walk	steadily	 for	 ten	minutes,	slow	down,	 turn	right,	.	.	."	etc.)	to	measure	position,	as	inertial	navigation	systems	do.	This	doesn't	preclude	them	 taking	 in	 spatial	 positions	 in	 a	 single	 glance.	 The	 test	 of	 whether	 an	 organism	 is	sensitive	to	allocentric	spatial	layout	is	its	ability	to	get	from	C	to	A	after	first	going	from	A	to	B	and	B	to	C,	where	A,	B,	and	C	are	not	collinear.	Similarly,	the	test	of	whether	it	represents	an	object's	shape	is	its	ability	to	trace	the	shape	from	multiple	different	starting	points—top,	bottom,	middle.	Touch	and	vision	might	be	able	to	keep	track	of	position	relative	to	a	starting	point	without	employing	 the	same	pre-existing	representation	of	 space.	 In	 fact,	 there	are	significant	structural	differences	between	touch	and	vision	regarding	how	they	represent	space	(Matthen	forthcoming).	So,	coordinating	the	two	senses	is	not	straightforward.		
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A	historical	aside.	Ibn	Tufail's	conjecture	about	the	newly	sighted	man	occurs	in	his	story,	Haiy	ibn	Yaqzan,	which	is	a	philosophical	allegory	about	a	boy	cast	away	at	birth	on	an	island.	Brought	up	by	a	gazelle,	and	utterly	deprived	of	human	contact,	this	boy	comes	to	know	everything	that	advanced	cultures	know,	from	the	manufacture	of	clothing,	to	morals	and	 religion,	 to	 cosmology.	 In	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	 this	 book	 was	 widely	 read,	supposedly	 influencing	Spinoza,	Hobbes,	 and	Locke	 (independently	of	Molyneux's	 letter),	and	inspiring	Defoe's	Robinson	Crusoe.	The	newly	sighted	man	is	a	thought	experiment	in	the	Introduction	to	the	book;	it	elaborates	the	theme	of	knowledge	in	the	absence	of	exposure	to	the	most	direct	sources	of	knowledge:	"Colours	were	such	as	he	had	before	conceiv'd	them	to	be,	by	those	descriptions	he	had	receiv'd."	Molyneux	cleverly	plucked	this	anecdote	from	the	book	(or	from	the	contemporary	discussion	surrounding	it)	and	sharpened	it.	But	since	it	is	couched	in	such	specific	terms,	it	is	difficult	to	know	exactly	how	he	viewed	the	problem.	Locke	himself	didn't	get	the	point	at	first	glance,	though	he	probably	knew	ibn	Tufail's	book.	Presumably,	Molyneux	 intended	 to	query	 ibn	Tufail's	 theme	of	knowledge	without	direct	experience.	Cross-modal	carry-over	isn't	the	only	consideration	relevant	to	this	theme,	nor	(as	Evans	realized)	is	associative	learning	vs	innateness.	This	is	why	we	cast	the	net	wider.		Given	this	historical	background,	it	is	entirely	possible	that	Molyneux	thought	about	his	 problem	 about	 cross-modal	 comparisons	 and	 associations	 simply	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 a	much	 wider	 puzzlement.	 You	 have	 all	 sorts	 of	 non-spatial	 perceptual	 ideas	 of	 familiar	things—of	your	loved	ones,	of	the	place	where	you	live,	of	your	clothes,	and	so	on.	You	have	many	 feelings	 evoked	 by	 perception:	 remember	 the	 terror	 induced	 in	 small	 animals	 by	looming	shadows.	Are	these	non-spatial	ideas	transferrable	from	one	modality	to	another,	or	comparable	between	them?	We'll	return	to	these	questions	below,	but	for	now	let's	just	acknowledge	that	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	Molyneux's	Question	was	ultimately	about	just	 shape.	 (In	 fact,	 Molyneux’s	 original	 formulation	 of	 the	 question	 to	 Locke	 explicitly	invokes	distance:	“Or	Whether	he	Could	know	by	his	sight,	before	he	stretchd	out	his	Hand,	whether	he	Could	not	Reach	them,	tho	they	were	Removed	20	or	1000	feet	from	him?”)	And	even	 if	 it	 was,	 there	 is,	 more	 importantly,	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 it	 reduces	 without	remainder	to	a	problem	about	the	representation	of	space.	
V.	Shape:	Foundation	and	Integration	
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Evans	holds	that	our	ideas	of	location	and/or	direction	are	shared	by	more	than	one	modality.	Suppose	he	is	right.	Let	a	light	be	switched	on.	Can	a	newly	sighted	man	point	to	it,	or	at	least	tell	whether	it	is	on	his	left	or	his	right?		Can	he	make	inter-modal	comparisons	among	these	presentations?	It	is	not	clear:	evidence	suggests	that	these	comparisons	emerge	over	a	complex	interactive	developmental	trajectory	(Thelen,	et	al,	2001).	Either	way,	this	does	not	settle	the	issue	about	shape.	Suppose	that	a	neonate	has	the	ability	to	locate	each	of	a	collection	of	points	by	both	vision	and	touch.	Suppose	further	that	she	can	discriminate	by	touch	whether	these	points	are	collinear	or	not.	Would	she	be	able	to	determine	by	vision	whether	these	points	are	collinear	or	not?	And,	similarly,	the	newly	sighted	person?	There	is	no	a	priori	reason	to	think	that	the	answer	to	these	questions	is	'yes'	and	no	reason	to	think	that	 it	 is	 'no'	either.	The	ability	 to	 locate	points	 in	space	 is	not	 the	same	as	 the	ability	 to	determine	 whether	 they	 stand	 in	 complex	 spatial	 relations.	 The	 senses	 may	 share	 a	representational	 framework	 for	 space	without	 sharing	 a	 representational	 framework	 for	shapes.	Given	 these	 observations,	 we	 propose	 to	 break	 the	 question	 of	 inter-modal	comparability	of	general	ideas	of	shapes	up	into	parts	as	follows.	1.	 Spatial	 Foundation.	 Does	 the	 ability	 to	 locate	 points	 by	 touch	 have	 the	 same	representational	basis	as	the	ability	to	locate	points	by	sight?	2.	 Integration	 Step.	 Given	 a	 set	 of	 points	 that	 have	 been	 located	 by	 the	 Spatial	Foundation	of	touch	and	also	that	of	vision,	is	the	ability	to	determine	by	touch	whether	they	constitute	an	 instance	of	a	shape	S	structurally	similar	 to	 the	ability	 to	determine	this	by	vision?	 And	 if	 so,	 would	 this	 help,	 or	 even	 enable,	 a	 newly	 sighted	 person	 to	 recognize	instances	of	S	by	vision	alone?	Our	general	view	is	that	these	questions	have	to	be	tackled	piecemeal.	The	ability	to	locate	points	may	be	context	dependent;	the	formation	of	general	ideas	of	shape	S	might	employ	the	same	integrative	tools	in	two	modalities,	but	this	might	not	be	the	case	for	shape	S’.		Even	 if	 Evans	 is	 right	 that	 the	 Spatial	 Foundation	 question	 should	 be	 answered	positively,	this	does	not	address	the	question	of	the	Integration	Step.	And	as	we	argued	in	the	preceding	section,	 it	 is	plausible	 to	 think	 that	different	modalities	might	address	 this	
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differently.	In	Matthen	and	Cohen	(forthcoming),	we	taxonomized	the	Integration	Step	by	the	dimensionality	of	shapes.	This	allowed	us	to	bring	a	number	of	different	empirical	studies	to	bear	on	the	issue,	because,	though	they	are	not	initially	addressed	to	Molyneux's	Question,	they	could	be	interpreted	as	addressing	the	Integration	Step.		In	 all	 of	 the	 cases	 we	 reviewed,	 we	 found	 that	 touch	 and	 vision	 follow	 different	strategies	in	the	Integration	Step.	So,	in	these	cases,	the	answer	was	indeed	No.	But	we	did	not	arrive	at	this	conclusion	by	a	general	argument;	we	had	to	adduce	cases	to	prove	each	No.	Thus,	there	is	no	path	to	a	general	answer	to	Molyneux's	Question.	Now,	as	we'll	argue	in	the	next	two	sections,	there	are	cases	where	the	Integration	Step	is	structurally	similar	across	 modalities.	 Since	 the	 integrative	 strategies	 followed	 by	 different	 mechanisms	 for	perceptual	 feature	extraction	are	diverse,	 there	 is	no	 reason	 to	 expect	 a	uniform	answer	across	all	features.12	
VI.	 Beyond	 Shape:	 The	 Perceptual	 Representation	 of	 Faces,	 Biological	Motion,	 and	
More	 So	 far,	we	have	 largely	 followed	mainstream	philosophical	 tradition	 in	 construing	Molyneux's	question	as,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	directed	at	 the	perceptual	 representation	of	shape.	 	But	our	articulation	of	the	question	into	foundational	and	integration	components	invites	 analogous	 questions	 about	 the	 foundational	 and	 integrative	 roots	 of	 non-shape	properties	as	well.	For	any	property	that	can	be	apprehended	by	multiple	modalities,	we	can	ask:	What	are	the	foundational	elements	and	integrative	procedures	enlisted	by	the	different	modalities?	And	are	these	sufficiently	similar	between	the	modalities	to	allow	crossmodal	transfer	(immediately,	with	certainty,	etc.)	for	ideas	of	these	properties?	This	 way	 of	 thinking	 of	 MQ	 is	 more	 fine-grained	 than	 our	 earlier	 dimensional	taxonomy	in	that	it	allows	for	obstacles	to	crossmodal	transfer	between	pairs	of	modalities	even	within	a	single	spatiotemporal	dimensional	regime,	and	even	when	there	can	be	other	
	12	 Note	 that	 our	 pluralism	 about	 Molyneux’s	 Question	 arises	 from	 our	 concern	 about	 particular	perceptual	 strategies	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	 individual	 features;	Glenney	 (2013)	 and	Hopkins	 (2005)	 endorse	pluralism	about	MQ	as	well,	but	for	different	reasons.	
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cases	of	successful	crossmodal	transfer	between	those	same	two	modalities	and	within	the	same	spatiotemporal	dimensional	regime.	To	see	some	of	the	potential	obstacles,	and	with	the	caveat	that,	as	we've	learned	from	the	shape	MQs,	we	can't	expect	our	answers	to	such	questions	to	generalize	automatically	between	cases,	we	want	to	review	a	number	of	instances	where	the	evidence	suggests	that	the	 foundational	and	 integration	steps	may	be	modally	 specific,	hence	where	crossmodal	transfer	may	fail.	As	an	initial	example	of	this	type,	we	can	consider	the	integrative	processes	at	work	in	the	visual	representation	of	human	faces.13	Though	there	are	a	number	of	ways	to	bring	out	the	special	features	of	these	processes,	one	of	the	most	striking	comes	from	the	so-called	Thatcher	 effect—the	 finding	 (Thompson	 1980)	 that	 local	 anomalies	 in	 the	 geometric	organization	of	faces	are	dramatically	harder	to	detect	in	upside-down	than	in	right-side	up	faces	 (see	 figure	 1).	 This	 result	 gives	 us	 reason	 for	 thinking	 that	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	integrative	 processes	 involved	 in	 the	 visual	 representation	 of	 faces	 can't	 be	 understood	simply	as	those	involved	the	ordinary	visual	 integration	of	metrical	spatial	 information—orientation	matters	as	well.	Faces,	then,	are	treated	as	a	kind	of	spatial	form,	but	a	kind	for	which	vision	reserves	special	 treatment.	(This	 is	yet	another	way	of	making	the	point	we	made	 at	 the	 end	 of	 section	 III:	 perceptually	 informed	 ideas	 of	 a	 property	 need	 not	 be	composed	the	same	way	as	the	property	itself.)		
	13	Material	in	this	and	the	next	section	overlaps	with	Cohen	(2018).	
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Figure	1:	The	Thatcher	Effect		There	 are	 several	 other	 effects	 suggesting	 that	 visual	 integration	 for	 the	representation	of	faces	is	special	relative	to	ordinary	spatial	form.	Thus,	detection	times	are	significantly	faster	for	faces	than	for	upside-down	faces	or	arbitrary	assemblages	of	facial	features	in	non-face	arrangements	(Purcell	and	Stewart	1988;	Farah	et.	al.	1995;	Yin,	1969).	Visual	 face	 recognition	 is	 susceptible	 to	 characteristic	 overgeneration	 errors:	 we	 (mis-)	recognize	 a	 face	 in	 a	 cloud	 or	 a	mountain	 far	more	 readily	 than	 other	 objects.	 It	 can	 be	selectively	 impaired	 in	 congenital	 or	 acquired	 defects	 (prosopagnosia)	 that	 spare	 other	aspects	of	visual	processing	 (Barton	2003).	And	 it	 is	no	surprise,	given	 these	and	similar	findings,	that	vision	devotes	special	resources	to	face	perception,	in	the	form	of	dedicated	processing	 (Kanwisher	 2010;	 Sinha	 et.	 al.	 2006;	 Sugita	 2009),	 carried	 out	 in	 specialized	neural	areas	(Liu,	Harris,	and	Kanwisher,	2010;	McCarthy	et.	al.	1997).	(But	see	below.)	Suppose	this	 is	all	correct	—	that,	 though	human	vision	 is	capable	of	 integrating	a	wide	range	of	two-dimensional	spatial	forms	from	lower	dimensional	spatial	information,	its	integration	of	 faces	 enjoys	 certain	 advantages	 relative	 to	 that	of	 other	 (equally	 complex)	
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spatial	forms	within	this	dimensional	regime.	Should	we	expect	this	fact	about	vision	to	hold	of	 other	modalities	 capable	 of	 representing	 spatial	 form?	 Not	 at	 all.	 There	 is	 no	 ex	 ante	guarantee	 that	 a	 second	 modality,	 m,	 that	 also	 integrates	 spatial	 information	 in	 two	dimensions,	will	also	carry	out	its	integrations	of	faces	in	the	special	ways	in	which	vision	appears	 to	 do.	 But	 if	 not,	 then	we	 should	 be	 unsurprised	 to	 find	 failures	 of	 crossmodal	transfer	between	vision	and	m	for	representation	of	faces	(or	other	properties	to	which	the	two	modalities	are	differentially	attuned).		We	 can	 test	 this	 conclusion	 by	 comparing	 face	 perception	 in	 vision	 against	 face	perception	in	two	other	modalities	capable	of	representing	two-dimensional	spatial	form:	ordinary	haptic	touch,	and	an	artificial	modality	for	sensory	substitution	that	presents	the	outputs	of	visual	transducers	to	(normal)	audition:	the	Prosthesis	for	Substitution	of	Vision	with	Audition	(PSVA)	of	Capelle	et	al,	1998.	Consider	 first	 the	 comparison	 to	 haptic	 touch.	 One	 significant	 difference	 between	visual	and	haptic	integrations	of	two-dimensional	form	is	that	the	two	modalities	differ	in	the	lower-dimensional	foundational	information	from	which	the	integrations	are	performed:	vision	works	 from	 point-colours	 (or	 point-intensities)	 in	 an	 external	 space,	while	 haptic	touch	works	from	point-pressure	in	bodily	space	(often	accompanied	by	awareness	of	willed	motion	 of	 our	 hands	 and	 other	 body	 parts).	 However,	 despite	 these	 foundational-step	differences	in	the	lower-dimensional	data	available	to	the	two	modalities,	it	turns	out	that	vision	and	haptic	touch	converge	on	the	results	of	form	integrations	in	a	wide	range	of	cases.	Moreover,	 and	 perhaps	 yet	more	 surprisingly,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 haptic	 touch	 treats	facehood,	 in	 particular,	 as	 special	 in	 some	 of	 the	ways	 that	 vision	 does.	 Specifically,	 the	existence	of	a	Thatcher	effect	for	haptic	touch	that	parallels	the	Thatcher	effect	for	vision	(Kilgour	 and	 Lederman	 2006)	 provides	 strong	 evidence	 that	 haptic	 touch,	 like	 vision,	 is	specially	 attuned	 to	 facehood,	 relative	 to	 equally	 complex	 two-dimensional	 spatial	 forms	(Lederman,	Klatzky,	and	Kitada	2010).	And,	since	the	two	modalities	align	in	apportioning	importance	 (i.e.,	 computational	 resources)	 to	 this	 one	 property	 of	 facehood,	 it's	 not	 too	surprising	 to	 learn	 that	 there	 is,	 indeed,	 bidirectional	 cross-modal	 transfer	 for	 facehood	between	 them	 in	 priming	 studies	 (Reales	 and	 Ballesteros,	 1999;	 Easton	 et	 al.,1997a,	 b;	
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Hadjikhani	and	Roland,	1998;	Kilgour	and	Lederman,	2002;	Casey	and	Newell,	2003,	2007;	Norman	et	al.,	2004).14	Now	consider	the	perception	of	two-dimensional	form	through	PSVA.	Here,	again,	the	foundational	data	from	which	the	modality	integrates	two-dimensional	form	information—consisting	of	auditory	pitches	organized	temporally,	accompanied	by	awareness	of	willed	motion	of	the	head/mounted	receptor	array—is	quite	different	from	the	data	on	the	basis	of	which	 vision	 performs	 its	 form	 integrations.	 Should	 one	 expect	 that	 there	 would	 be	significant	differences	in	the	integrative	processing	methods	employed	by	PSVA	and	vision?	Our	point	 is	 that	what	we	know	about	vision	and	haptic	 touch	gives	us	no	 firm	basis	 for	answering	this	question	one	way	or	the	other.	In	particular,	we	cannot	assume	that	the	form	integrations	corresponding	to	faces	will	be	favoured	under	PSVA	(as	they	are	in	vision	and	haptic	touch)	over	those	corresponding	to	equally	complex	forms.	And	there	is	no	evidence	of	a	Thatcher	effect	for	PSVA.	15	What	can	we	conclude	from	the	above	evidence?	First,	it	seems	that	there	are	certain	similarities	 between	 vision	 and	 touch	with	 regard	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 face-ideas.	 This	suggests	 that	 there	will	 be	 some	 cross-modal	 carry-over	 between	 the	 two	modalities.	 Of	course,	 it	 would	 be	 far	 too	 hasty	 to	 jump	 to	 a	 positive	 response	 to	 the	 Molyneux-type	question	whether	a	newly	sighted	man	could	recognize	the	face	of	his	lover	by	sight	alone.16	And,	 indeed,	 it	 would	 be	 too	 quick	 even	 to	 conclude	 that	 he	 could	 immediately	 make	judgements	like	"That	looks	like	a	hooked	nose."	For	as	we	noted	earlier,	similarity	of	content	does	not	 imply	 equal	 ease	 of	 application.	Nevertheless,	we	 can	 expect	 some	 cross-modal	parallels	between	visual	and	haptic	face	perception	that	do	not	hold	with	respect	to	the	visual	and	haptic	perception	of	spatial	form	in	general.	It	would	not	be	surprising,	for	example,	to	
	14	 	Investigators	have	taken	these	findings	to	suggest	that	vision	and	touch	processes	share	at	least	some	structural	representations	of	 faces.	 It	remains	controversial	whether	such	shared	representations	are	more	closely	allied	with	a	format	used	by	one	of	the	modalities	(which	would	mean	that	interaction	with	the	other	modality	would	involve	a	certain	amount	of	representational	remapping),	or	whether	they	are	expressed	in	a	common	and	modally	unspecific	format.	15	 There	 are	 other	 sensory	 substitution	 systems	 that	 transform	 visual	 input	 to	 auditory	 output;	consistent	with	our	general	approach,	we	also	should	not	assume	that	any	conclusions	about	PSVA	will	extend	to	these.	16	Brian	Glenney	notes	that	face-blindess	is	a	common	deficit	among	the	newly	sighted	(Fine	et	al,	2003;	Cattaneo	and	Vecchi	2011:	98-102).	Whether	this	is	related	to	Molyneux’s	Question	is	unclear.	
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find	 that	 the	 newly	 blind	 person	 would	 preferentially	 pick	 up	 on	 certain	 cues	 for	 face	recognition	or	be	quicker	to	learn	it	under	haptic	presentation.	So,	while	we	would	not	have	an	answer	to	Molyneux’s	question	for	faces,	we	would	expect	some	positive	answers	in	the	general	vicinity.17	However,	we	cannot	assume	that	any	such	correspondence	would	generalize	to	other	cases.	As	noted,	there	is	a	mismatch	between	the	capacities	for	integrating	faces	in	vision	(where	such	integrations	are	given	special	status	relative	to	other	 integrations	built	 from	spatial	 foundational	data)	and	in	PSVA	(where	they	are	not).	Under	these	conditions,	one	would	 not	 expect	 that	 there	 should	 be	 crossmodal	 transfer	 of	 integration	 for	 facehood	between	the	two	modalities.18		Having	made	these	observations,	it	is	now	natural	to	ask	whether	and	how	widely	the	special	integrative	processes	at	work	in	vision	(and	perhaps	other	modalities)	extend.	On	the	evidence,	there	do	appear	to	be	other	types	of	two-dimensional	spatial	forms,	beyond	human	faces,	to	which	vision	(at	least)	applies	special	integrative	processes.	Take,	for	instance,	the	visual	 system's	ability	 to	 classify	automatically,	quickly,	 and	easily,	 certain	but	not	other,	equally	complex,	patterns	of	a	few	moving	points	of	light	as	reflecting	the	motion	of	key	joints	in	a	moving	organism	(Johansson	1973).		
	17	This	is	broadly	consonant	with	the	differences	in	learning	speed	for	different	cues	reported	by	Sinha	and	colleagues	for	shapes.	See	Matthen	and	Cohen	forthcoming:	section	VI.	18	Specifically,	one	would	not	expect	to	see	crossmodal	transfer	of	integration	for	facehood	from	the	modality	attuned	to	the	property	(vision)	to	the	modality	not	attuned	to	the	property	(PSVA);	this	 leaves	it	open	that	there	might	be	transfer	in	the	other	direction.	
WHAT	WAS	MOLYNEUX’S	QUESTION	A	QUESTION	ABOUT?	
	 20	
	
Figure	2:	Subjects	visually	distinguish	moving	patterns	that	reflect	the	motion	of	key	
joints	in	an	organism	from	random,	but	equally	complex,	patterns.		Like	 visual	 perception	 of	 faces,	 visual	 perception	 of	 biological	 motion	 appears	 to	involve	specialized	processing	(Lu	2010),	to	be	carried	out	in	specialized	areas	(Allison	et	al	2000;	Grossman,	et	al	2000),	and	can	be	spared	 in	 injuries	 that	damage	gross	motor	and	other	spatial	abilities	 (Jordan	et.	al	2002;	Kim	et.	al	2008).	Moreover,	 there	 is	a	Thatcher	effect	 for	 biological	 motion	 as	 well:	 it	 is	 significantly	 easier	 to	 detect	 local	 anomalies	(anomalies	that	perturb	the	visual	classification	of	the	motion	as	biological)	in	displays	that	are	right	side	up	than	in	displays	that	are	inverted	(Troje	and	Westhoff	2006;	Mirenzi	and	Hiris	2011).		And,	indeed,	there	is	evidence	that	at	least	some	of	the	criteria	we	have	appealed	to	in	the	foregoing	extend	to	yet	further	properties	(especially	with	perceptual	learning).		Thus,	Twedt,	 Sheinberg,	 and	Gauthier	2007,	 and	Wong	et.	 al.	 2010	 find	evidence	of	 a	Thatcher	effect	in	vision	for	a	range	of	non-face	object	types,	including	cars,	buildings,	bikes,	and	letter	strings.	And	researchers	have	found	face-like	reduced	reaction	times	in	visual	recognition	tasks	 and	disproportionate	 costs	 for	 recognizing	 inverted	 figures	by	 experts	with	 a	wide	range	of	non-face	domains,	including	particular	dog	breeds	(Diamond	and	Carey,	1986),	and	novel	artificial	("greeble")	figures	(Gauthier	&	Tarr,	1997).19	
	19	 The	 generalizability	 of	 such	 face-like	 effects	 to	 other	properties	naturally	 leads	 to	doubts	 about	whether	the	allegedly	face-specific	processing	and	face-specific	neural	areas	are	as	domain-dedicated	as	many	have	held.	
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Taken	together,	these	results	suggest	that	vision	can	become	specially	attuned	to—can	come	to	perform	specialized	integrations	for—a	range	of	form	properties	in	a	variety	of	ways,	some	perhaps	innately	specified,	some	perhaps	not.	However	wide	this	range	turns	out	to	be,	it	does	seem	that	vision	is,	in	the	ways	we	have	elaborated,	more	attuned	to	some	spatial	form	properties	than	others.	Thus,	even	if	it	is	true	(and	it	may	not	be)	that	the	ideas	enlisted	in	the	visual	perception	of	form	all	share	a	common	spatial	foundation,	they	may	nonetheless	differ	in	the	way	they	are	integrated	from	their	foundations.	And	if	there	can	be	such	differences	for	ideas	of	spatial	form	within	a	modality,	there	is	all	the	more	reason	for	thinking	that	crossmodal	transfer	may	fail.	For,	again,	modalities	might	build	their	ideas	of	a	spatial	form	from	distinct	foundations,	and	even	if	they	share	foundations,	they	may	carry	out	 their	 compositional	 steps	 in	 different	ways,	 so	 that	whatever	 special	 advantages	 (of	speed,	accuracy,	etc.)	exhibited	in	a	first	modality	may	fail	to	manifest	in	a	second.	
VII.	Another	Clue	to	Modality-Specific	Processing:	Evidence	from	Illusion	Another	 strategy	 for	 uncovering	 modality-specific	 forms	 of	 integration	 that	 may	impede	crossmodal	 transfer	 involves	reflecting	on	classic	perceptual	 illusions.	Perceptual	illusions	within	 a	modality	 can	be	 viewed	 as	 signatures	 of	 integrative	processes	 at	work	within	 that	 modality	 because	 they	 reflect	 how	 these	 processes	 can	 go	 wrong	 in	reconstructing	the	world.	That	vision	responds	to	the	Müller	-Lyer	configuration	in	its	usual,	illusory,	 way,	 tells	 us	 that	 the	 processes	 underlying	 our	 visual	 integration	 of	 two-dimensional	form	lead	to	a	characteristic	type	of	misestimate—one	that	may	or	may	not	be	replicated	by	integrative	processes	for	the	same	two-dimensional	form	in	other	modalities.20	Now,	investigators	have	known	for	some	time	that	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion,	and	other	geometric	illusions	(e.g.,	the	Poggendorff,	the	vertical-horizontal	illusion)	have	counterparts	in	haptic	perception	(Bean	1938,	Over	1966).	Commentators	have	sometimes	concluded	that	such	transfer	between	modalities	will	occur	quite	generally	(e.g.,	across	many	different	pairs	
	20	Highlighting	failures	of	crossmodal	transfer	for	this	class	of	integrations	is	also	useful	in	bringing	out	that	 special	 features	 of	 particular	modalities	 need	 not	 be	 those	 that	 possess	 adaptive	 significance.	 This	 is	salutary	 because	 it	 takes	 us	 beyond	 the	 domain	 of	 biologically	 significant	 features	 such	 as	 facehood	 and	biological	motion.	
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of	natural	and	artefactual	modalities,	especially	after	extended	perceptual	 learning).21	We	want	to	suggest	that	the	evidence	supports	a	more	guarded	assessment:	sometimes	transfer	occurs,	sometimes	it	does	not,	and	even	where	it	does	there	may	be	interesting	differences	to	note.	To	 begin	 with	 a	 case	 of	 successful	 transfer,	 consider	 the	 susceptibility	 of	 haptic	perception	to	the	same	errors	of	line	length	estimation	present	in	visual	perception	of	the	Müller-Lyer	 configuration.	 It	 is	 striking	 that	 the	effect	not	only	occurs	 in	both	visual	 and	haptic	perception,	but	that	its	visual	and	haptic	manifestations	are	analogous	in	a	number	of	more	specific	respects.	 In	both	cases,	errors	are	larger	for	more	acute	angles	(Over	1966,	Heller	et.	al.	2002)	and	decrease	with	exposure	time/perceptual	learning	(Rudel	and	Teuber	1963).	In	both	cases,	explicit	instructions	to	ignore	the	fins	in	favour	of	focusing	on	body-centered	cues	 reduces	error	 rates	significantly	 (Millar	and	Al-Attar	2002).	And	 there	 is	a	strong	positive	correlation	between	magnitudes	of	visual	and	haptic	misestimates	within	individual	subjects	(Gentaz	et.	al.	2004).	Finally,	the	haptic	effect	seems	equally	present	in	sighted,	 sighted	 but	 blindfolded,	 sighted	 but	 low-vision,	 and	 congenitally	 blind	 subjects	(Heller	et.	al.	2002).	This	series	of	shared	features	is	notable,	and	encourages	the	impression	that	analogous	integrative	mechanisms	may	be	at	work	across	modalities.	On	the	other	hand,	we	can	see	that	this	situation	is	far	from	guaranteed	by	considering	a	pair	of	papers	by	Laurent	Renier	and	colleagues	on	two	classic	cases—the	Ponzo	illusion	(depicted	in	figure	3)	and	the	vertical-horizontal	illusion	(depicted	in	figure	4)—in	subjects	using	a	prosthesis	for	substitution	of	vision	with	audition	(PSVA)	(Renier	et.	al.	2005;	Renier,	Bruyer,	and	DeVolder	2006).	
	21	For	example,	such	optimism	about	transfer	emerges	from	the	reports	of	Gerard	Guarniero	(1977),	a	congenitally	blind	philosophy	Ph.D.	student	who	served	as	a	subject	for	Paul	Bach	y	Rita's	celebrated	work	with	Tactile-Visual	 Sensory	 Substitution	 (TVSS),	 and	who	went	 on	 to	 write	 a	 dissertation	 on	 space	 perception	(Guarniero	1977b),	and	also	from	the	approving	citations	of	these	remarks	by	Bach	y	Rita	(1984)	and	Noë	and	O'Regan	(2002).	Unfortunately,	it	is	somewhat	unclear	what	to	make	of	these	claims:	both	because	Guarniero's	reports	are	anecdotal,	and	because	it	is	not	obvious	that	the	emerging	abilities	are	perceptual	rather	than	post-perceptual,	it	is	not	obvious	that	they	show	anything	at	all	about	intermodal	transfer.		
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Figure	3	The	Ponzo	illusion:	Parallel	horizontal	lines	of	equal	length	appear	unequal	
when	displayed	over	a	pair	of	oblique	lines	that	converge	toward	the	top	of	the	display.			
	
Figure	4	The	Vertical-Horizontal	Illusion:	Subjects	systematically	over-estimate	the	
length	of	vertical	lines.		Renier	et	al	were	able	to	induce	both	the	Ponzo	and	vertical-horizontal	illusions	(in	some	 subjects)	 under	 PSVA,	 but	 only	 after	 a	 non-trivial	 period	 of	 training	with	 the	 new	modality.	This	would	seem	to	show,	by	itself,	that	facility	with	the	(characteristically	illusion-
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prone)	 integration	 of	 two-dimensional	 length	 information	 in	 vision	 does	 not	 transfer	immediately	to	just	any	other	modality	capable	of	recovering	two-dimensional	form.	But	 putting	 things	 this	 way	 understates	 the	 obstacles	 to	 intermodal	 transfer	uncovered	by	this	work.	In	fact,	Renier	et.	al.	2005	report	that,	initially,	their	subjects	were	not	susceptible	to	the	Ponzo	illusion	under	PSVA	at	all,	because	they	were	able	to	perform	the	 line	 length	 estimation	 task	 without	 attending	 to	 representations	 of	 the	 converging	oblique	 lines	crucial	 to	the	visual	version	of	 the	 illusion.	Only	by	requiring	subjects	using	PSVA	to	consider	the	two	oblique	lines	of	the	stimuli	before	comparing	the	length	of	the	two	horizontal	bars,	could	they	make	the	illusion	re-emerge.	But	even	under	this	condition,	the	effect	remained	weak:	they	found	the	effect	in	sighted	subjects	(but	still	smaller	in	magnitude	than	among	control	 sighted	subjects	not	using	PSVA),	but	not	at	 all	 in	 their	 “early	blind”	subjects	(subjects	blind	before	their	20th	month	of	age).	And	Renier,	Bruyer,	and	DeVolder	(2006)	report	a	similar	pattern	for	the	vertical-horizontal	illusion:	the	effect	was	strongest	in	sighted	control	subjects	not	using	PSVA,	somewhat	weaker	in	blindfolded	sighted	subjects	using	PSVA,	and	completely	absent	in	early	blind	subjects	using	PSVA.	These	 results	 illustrate	 different	 obstacles	 to	 crossmodal	 transfer	 for	 integration,	even	for	a	pair	of	modalities	capable	of	recovering	two-dimensional	form	properties.	First,	perceptual	expertise	for	the	relevant	integration	type	may	be	present	in	one	modality	but	not	the	other,	with	the	result	that	transfer	is	impossible	without	(possibly	quite	elaborate)	training.	Second,	because	perceptual	attention	may	be	fixed	in	quite	different	ways	between	the	 two	 modalities,	 integrations	 that	 depend	 on	 which	 elements	 of	 a	 perceptual	configuration	are	attended	(or	in	what	order)	may	succeed	in	one	modality	but	not	another.	Third,	and	finally,	the	results	with	both	the	Ponzo	and	the	vertical-horizontal	configurations	show	that	the	possibility	or	robustness	of	a	given	integrative	strategy	may	depend	on	the	subject's	 perceptual	 history	 with	 a	 given	 modality;	 consequently,	 between-modality	variation	in	this	respect	may	block	crossmodal	transfer	as	well.		
VIII.	Perceptual	Affect:	Does	It	Carry	Over?	
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Finally,	 it	 is	worth	noting	yet	another	perceptual	phenomenon	that	 falls	under	 ibn	Tufail's	rubric	of	learning	and	potentially	under	Molyneux's	paradigm	of	crossmodal	transfer	as	well.	This	 is	 the	 link	between	perception	and	affect	 in	what	has	been	called	evaluative	perception.	 Introspection	 and	 a	 large	 and	 growing	 body	 of	 evidence	 reveal	 that	 our	perceptual	states	have	an	affective	dimension—certain	smells	are	disgusting,	certain	tactile	experiences	pleasant,	certain	flavours	repulsive,	certain	sights	and	sounds	beautiful,	certain	pains	unbearable,	certain	melodies	melancholy,	and	so	on.	An	aperçu	of	Ibn	Tufail	invites	us	to	consider	the	transferability	of	such	affect:	he	says	that	his	newly-sighted	man	experiences	“great	joy”	when	he	becomes	visually	acquainted	with	the	colours—his	earlier	descriptive	knowledge	of	them	presumably	offered	no	such	delights.	(Goodman	19xx,	7-8)	Despite	 significant	 controversy	 about	 the	 best	 theoretical	 account	 of	 the	 affective	dimensions	of	perceptual	experience,	we	can	take	it	as	a	relatively	uncontroversial	starting	point	 that	 these	phenomena	can	be	 characterized	 in	 terms	of	 three	 central	psychological	features:	 at	 a	minimum,	 affective	 perceptual	 states	 are	 valenced;	 they	 have	motivational	force;	and	they	confer	reasons	to	the	subjects	in	whom	they	occur.22	Evaluative	perception	raises	all	kinds	of	interesting	questions,	but	two	in	particular	are	relevant	to	our	present	investigation.	The	first,	which	is	closer	to	ibn	Tufail's,	is	whether	affect	is	a	constituent	part	of	certain	perceptions	or	a	distinct	state	that	accompanies	them.	Is	 the	 perceptual	 experience	 of	 certain	 melodies	 itself	 sad	 or	 melancholy,	 or	 are	 these	emotions	 mere	 accompaniments?	 Would	 an	 inexperienced	 listener	 necessarily	 feel	 the	emotions	of	the	“morning	effect”	when	he	listened	to	a	sensitive	rendering	of	Raga	Vibhas?23	Is	 startle	part	 and	parcel	of	hearing	 sudden	 loud	 sounds,	or	 is	 it	 a	distinct	 state	 that	has	somehow	become	associated	with	them?	Would	someone	necessarily	jump	when	she	first	heard	a	clap	of	thunder	or	a	flash	of	lightning?	Must	a	newly	sighted	person	become	erotically	aroused	at	her	first	sight	of	a	naked	body?	
	22	 For	useful	overviews	of	philosophical	work	on	 this	 topic,	 see	Aydede	and	Fulkerson	 (2015)	and	Bergqvist	and	Cowan	(2018).	23	Raga	Vibhas,	which	 is	usually	played	before	sunrise,	 is	 said	 to	evoke	a	 feeling	of	 the	morning	 in	listeners.	The	reader	can	judge	for	herself	at	https://youtu.be/YAt6jW8QvJE		
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The	 second,	 closely	 related	 to	 Molyneux's,	 is	 this:	 Is	 a	 person	 who	 experiences	something	in	one	modality	subject	to	the	same	affect	as	when	she	experiences	it	in	another?	Would	a	newly	sighted	person	experience	a	shape	or	a	texture	as	visually	pleasant	if	she	had	previously	 found	 it	 haptically	 pleasant	 (holding	 relevant	 contextual	 dimensions	 fixed)?	Could	she	experience	it	as	visually	pleasant	though	haptically	without	affect,	or	as	visually	pleasant	and	haptically	unpleasant?	We	see	no	a	priori	reason	to	believe	that	distinct	modalities	need	(or	for	that	matter	need	not)	 bear	 or	 connect	with	 the	 same/analogous	 affective	dimensions	 at	 all.	Nor	 is	 it	obvious,	in	the	case	that	they	do,	that	a	history	of	experiences	of	a	given	affective	type	in	one	modality	will	(or	won't)	facilitate	the	acquisition	or	deployment	of	that	affective	type	in	a	different	 modality.	 How	 soon	 before	 a	 newly	 sighted	 person	 has	 visual	 affective	startle/erotic	 arousal/musical	pleasure?	Would	having	 a	history	of	 repulsion	 in	olfaction	give	 the	 newly	 sighted	 person	 an	 advantage	 in	 acquiring	 affective	 repulsion	 in	 vision	(relative	to	a	newly	sighted	person	without	a	history	of	olfactory	repulsion)?	As	 in	other	cases	considered	above,	 there	might	not	be	a	single	answer	across	 the	board.	We	take	it	that	the	answers	to	these	Molyneux	Questions	about	affect	are	unobvious,	and	will	depend	on	the	local,	particular,	details	of	the	psychological	mechanisms	implicated	by	the	specific	modalities	at	issue.	
IX.	Conclusion	As	we	have	seen,	Molyneux's	question,	ostensibly	about	the	crossmodal	application	of	sensory	knowledge,	is	a	special	instance	of	the	broader	set	of	questions	(prompted	by	ibn	Tufail)	 about	 the	 fungibility	 of	 the	 senses—that	 is,	 about	 how	 knowledge	 and	 general	representations/ideas	that	are	normally	formed	in	one	way	in	one	modality	can	be	formed	in	another	way	in	another	modality.	This	broader	question	about	fungibility	leads	us	to	ask	about	 the	 respects	 in	which	 such	 ideas	 do	 and	 do	 not	 converge,	 as	well	 as	 the	 range	 of	crossmodal	 transfers	 they	 underwrite.	 The	 variety	 evident	 in	 the	 cases	 we've	 examined	shows	 that	 no	 general	 answers	 are	 forthcoming:	 there	 are	 instances	 of	 both	 crossmodal	divergence	 and	 convergence;	 and	 even	 convergence,	 where	 it	 is	 found,	 is	 insufficient	 to	guarantee	crossmodal	transfer.	Given	all	this	variety,	it	is	likely	that	an	adequate	response	to	
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Molyneux's	question	will	require	coming	to	grips	with	the	broader	set	of	issues	raised	by	ibn	Tufail.24		 	
	24	We	are	grateful	for	comments	from	and	discussion	with	Matthew	Fulkerson,	Ayoob	Shahmoradi,	and	Brian	Tracz,	and	for	suggestions	from	the	editors	of	this	volume,	all	of	which	have	much	improved	the	paper.	
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